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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the requirements of quantum meruit have been

satisfied.
2.

Whether the plaintiff is precluded from quantum

meruit recovery because of his contract with a party other
than the defendant.
3.

Whether the facts and equities of this case require

that the lower court's judgment be upheld.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
(References [R at

] are to the Agreed Statement of

the record on Appeal)
Defendant, doing business as Post Petroleum Company,
owned a 33.75% working interest in an oil well located in
Uintah County, Utah.

[R at 1].

The oil well was operated by

a corporation, Post Petroleum Company, Inc. (sometimes referred
to as "corporation11 below).

[R at 2],

Plaintiff entered into

an oral contract with the corporation, completing the agreed
services in a reasonable time and manner.

[R at 2]. The

parties agree that $18,437.13 is the reasonable value of the
services and materials furnished by the plaintiff pursuant to
the contract.

[R at 2].

Upon completion of plaintiff's services,

he billed the corporation for the entire amount, as instructed
by the corporation.

Although both the defendant and the

corporation knew that plaintiff had billed the wrong party,
neither ever informed the plaintiff of this fact.

-1-

[R at 2].

When payment was not received, plaintiff filed a
mechanic's lien against the interest of the corporation in
the well.

[R at 3].

The corporation, without making any

payments to plaintiff, later filed bankruptcy in Oklahoma.
It was not until plaintiff received the bankruptcy pleadings
that he learned of the defendant's ownership interest in the
oil well.

[R at 3].

Plaintiff filed a claim in the bankruptcy

proceeding, but later amended that claim to discount the amount
of recovery in the present matter.

[R at 3].

The present matter was submitted to the Seventh Judicial
District Court on stipulated facts essentially the same as
those in the Agreed Statement of Record on Appeal.

Judge

Davidson found that the elements of quantum meruit had been
satisfied, that the relationship between the defendant and the
corporation unjustly confused plaintiff as to the proper party
from which to seek payment, and that the defendant was the
ultimate beneficiary of the contract between the plaintiff
and the corporation.

[R at 4].

Based on those findings, the

judge partially granted plaintiff's prayer for relief,
reducing the amount due under the contract by the 66.257o
interest in the well owned by non-parties, together with
costs of court and interest at the rate of 12% from June 17,
1982.

[R at 4 ] .
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff in the lower court successfully demonstrated
that the requirements for quantum meruit recovery have been
satisfied.

Defendant has acquired and retained a benefit,

at the expense of the plaintiff, which, under the circumstances,
require the imposition of an implied-in-law contract to protect
the interests of the plaintiff.

Although Utah case law exists

which facially seem to support the defendant's position, those
cases are distinguishable herein.

The knowledge and silence

of the defendant, the relationship between the defendant and
the corporation, and the inability of the plaintiff to recover
the full value of his services from the corporation will work
injustice on the plaintiff if quantum meruit recovery is not
allowed.

The lower court's judgment should therefore be

affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.
PLAINTIFF HAS SATISFIED THE ELEMENTS OF QUANTUM MERUIT
This Court recently reiterated the elements of quantum
meruit recovery in Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 557
(Utah, 1984), stating:
"Unjust enrichment occurs whenever a person has
and retains money or benefits that in justice
and equity belong to another. Thus, in order
for a claim based on unjust enrichment to be
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successful, there must be (1) a benefit
conferred on one person by another; (2)
an appreciation or knowledge by the conferee
of the benefit; and (3) the acceptance or
retention by the conferee of the benefit
under such circumstances as to make it
inequitable for the conferee to retain
the benefit without payment of its value." •
It has been stipulated in the present matter, that the
value of plaintiff's services to the well property is and was
$18,473.13-

Again by stipulation, it has been determined

that the defendant is the owner of a 33.757o working interest
in the well.

The benefit to the property is therefore, to

the extent of defendant's ownership, a benefit to the
defendant.

The first element of quantum meruit recovery has

been fulfilled, and is not challenged by defendant in this
appeal.
As for the second element, in General Leasing Company v.
Manivest Corporation, 667 P.2d 596, 598 (Utah, 1983), this
court stated that "where the property owner has requested the
installation or services or has acquiesced in their benefits11
the trier of fact can appropriately find an implied contract
to pay for those benefits. Here, the defendant contracted
with Post Petroleum Company, Inc., to operate the well in
question, knowing full well that successful operation would
require that certain improvements (such as those provided
by the plaintiff) be made.

The contract with Post Petroleum

Company, Inc., therefore constitutes a "request11 for improvements under the language of General Leasing.

-A-

Moreover, there

is no dispute that the defendant had knowledge of the
improvements, both at the time of the contract and during
the construction period.

His failure to object to them

constitutes "acquiescence11 in their bestowal.

This element

of quantum meruit is also satisfied, and again, is not
challenged by defendant in this appeal.
Finally, recovery under quantum meruit requires a
showing that the benefit has been accepted or retained
"under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the
conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value.11
Berrett, supra.

In the present matter, defendant Post knew

that plaintiff had sought payment from Post Petroleum
Company, Inc., that plaintiff had filed a mechanicfs lien
against the corporation, and that the corporation had filed
bankruptcy in Oklahoma.

Despite this knowledge, neither

defendant nor the corporation ever informed plaintiff that
it was the defendant' s dba and not the corporation that
actually owned the property and received the benefits of
the plaintiff's labor.

Plaintiff's ability to collect from

the corporation having now been impaired, it would be unjust
for the defendant to retain the value of plaintiff's
services.

Under a less inequitable set of facts, it may

well be that plaintiff would not be entitled to a quantum
meruit recovery.

But, as found by Judge Davidson in his

Ruling below, the fact that defendant was the ultimate
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beneficiary of the

, coupled with the relationship

between defendant

>rporation, has resulted in an

unjust enrichment

fendant at the expense of the

plaintiff.
II.
UTAH CASE 1
RECOVERY U!
Defendant (i

)T PRECLUDE QUANTUM MERUIT
5
ECIFIC FACTS OF THIS CASE
r

) relies on the language or

Kershaw v. Tracy

,k & Trust Co., 561 P.2d 683,

685 (Utah, 1977),

;es, "clearly every benefit

conferred is not

>le and unjustly received."

But defendant tak

iguage out of context.

dealt with servic

d pursuant to a believed moral

obligation.

In t.

that plaintiff rehe would receive :

Kershaw

matter, however, it is clear
services upon the belief that
it therefor.

Kershaw is therefore

inapplicable on i
The holding

Lai Fixtures & Furnishings, Inc.

v. Adams, 564 P.2

i, 1977), is also distinguishable

here.

aercial Fixtures the lease

First of a

between the tenan

landowner specifically provided

that all costs of

its were to be paid by the lessee,

This Court stated

leral rule, a tenant's creditors

have no greater r:

irge the land with the value of

improvements or repairs than the tenant would have,11 noting
that in Commercial Fixtures, the tenant had contracted all
such rights away. 564 P.2d at 774.

There has been no

similar relinquishment of rights in the instant case.
Moreover, in Commercial Fixtures, the plaintiff made
no attempt to exhaust any of his available legal remedies,
and did not show any sufficient excuse for his inaction
against the lessee. To the contrary, plaintiff in this case
filed a mechanic's lien which, due to Post Petroleum
Corporation Inc.'s bankruptcy proceedings, has become at
least partially impaired.

Plaintiff submits that the

intervening bankruptcy constitutes a sufficient excuse for
disregarding his legal remedies pending recovery against
defendant in this matter.
Finally, in Commercial Fixtures, this Court stated:
The mere fact that a third person benefits
from a contract between two others does not
make such third person liable in quasicontract, unjust enrichment, or restitution.
[Citation omitted]. There must be some misleading act, request for services, or the
like, to support such an action. Mere
failure of performance by one of tEe
contracting parties does not give rise to
a right of restitution. Emphasis added.
564 P2.d at 774.
In the present matter, there exists much more than mere
failure of performance.

There were "misleading acts11--the

silence of both defendant and the corporation as to who
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would ultimately be responsible for payment.

There was a

"request for services11—defendant !s contract with the
corporation to operate the well, knowing that improvements
would have to be made.

And there was an obvious "or the

like" circumstances—the related ownership interests of the
benefitted property and the businesses.

On the facts of

this case, the rule laid down in Commercial Fixtures must
bend to the exception expressly provided for in that opinion.
Plaintiff submits that the facts of this appeal more
closely resemble those in Paschall's Inc. v. Dozier, 407
S.W.2d 150 (Tenn., 1966), than the facts of Commercial
Fixtures.

In Paschall1s, the plaintiff had furnished

materials to the residence of the defendant pursuant to the
request of the defendant's daughter.

Plaintiff then

attempted to collect from the daughter, but the daughter
filed bankruptcy.

The plaintiff then brought suit against

the owner on a quantum meruit theory.

The Supreme Court

of Tennessee, holding that the plaintiff could recover,
stated:
Aside from unjust enrichment...it is
generally accepted that, other than the
statutory right to a mechanic's lien or
other special statutory remedies, subcontractors and materialmen have no right
to a personal judgment against the owner
where there is no contractual relation
between them. Emphasis in original.

The defendants assert that an implied undertaking cannot arise against one benefited by
the work performed, where the work is done
under a special contract with another. While
this may be the general rule, we do not think
that it is applicable in every case. Indisputably, where one is afforded recovery from the
person with whom he has a contract, he cannot
also recover from third persons incidentally
benefited by his performance. In such a case
it could hardly be said that the retention of
the benefit by the third party is unjust as
to the furnisher. However, the situation is
dissimilar where a person furnishes materials
and labor under a contract for the benefit
of a third party, and that contract becomes
unenforceable or invalid. In that situation
there is certainly no reason to preclude the
furnisher or subcontractor from seeking
recovery against the third person on the
theory of quantum meruit.
407 S.W.2d 153, 154.
Although the Paschall1s opinion's only recognition to
date by this Court has been in Justice Maughanfs dissenting
opinion in Commercial Fixtures, plaintiff submits that
under the facts of the present matter Paschall1s is directly
in point, and urges the Court to adopt its reasoning here.
III.
THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW REQUIRES
THAT THE LOWER COURT BE UPHELD
A recovery for services in quantum meruit is equitable
in nature.
1983).

Christensen v. Abbott, 671 P.2d 121, 123 (Utah,

This Court may therefore review both legal and

factual questions, but because of the advantaged position of
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the trial court, "considerable deference11 is given to the
trial court's findings and judgment.

Christensen, supra;

Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah, 1984).

It has

even been stated that in equity cases, the findings and
judgment of the trial court are entitled to a "presumption
of correctness11 and will not be upset unless the evidence
"clearly preponderates against them."
P.2d 1246 (Utah, 1979).

Ovard v. Cannon, 600

Plaintiff respectfully submits that

the evidence in the present matter does not preponderate
against the written Ruling of the lower court, and prevails
upon this Court to affirm the Ruling and Judgment.
CONCLUSION
Respondent requests that the decision of the lower court
be affirmed in all respects, and that costs of this appeal be
granted.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this / ^ ^

day of July, 1985.
^7C0KE & VINCENT
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